thick+objects+(Brucato)

=**Thick Objects**=

**Definition**
Merriam-Webster's primary definition of "thick" is: //a// **:** having or being of relatively great depth or extent from one surface to its opposite  //b// **:** heavily buil t

"Thick objects" refers to large-scale artifacts that are riven with political qualities. "Dikes and dams, levees and anicuts, storm surge barriers and tanks—these are thick things" (Bijker 2007: 109). "[T]hings are thick with [...] a broad range of politics, from the micro to the macro scale, [...] related as much to the power of humans as to the power of ideas and things. Recognizing that things are thick with politics also draws attention to the crucial relation of things to people, of things needing to be embedded in a culture if you want them to work" (Bijker 2007: 123).

Introduction
"Thick objects" is a concept introduced by Wiebe Bijker in reference to large-scale development projects, such as irrigation canals and dams. These objects are not just physically "thick," but also "thick with connections and linkages" (technically and socially), "thick with values," "thick with power," and "thick with politics" (Bijker 2007: 109).

Political qualities are embedded in the artifact as a result of design elements determined by their historical context and the shaping by political actors. The political qualities are also conveyed by the artifact, dispensing or consuming power, likely disproportionately to some according to their class, socio-political or technical status.

"Technologies are not only shaped by political forces; they also exert political force themselves: on social stratification [...]. We should recognize, then, that the functioning of technologies and the functioning of societies are intricately linked" (Bijker 2007: 109).

Bijker writes that “things can be understood only within their social context: they are socially constructed, and they shape social relations. They are, for example, thick with power relations and politics” (2007: 115). Bijker’s concept of “thick objects” considers how large-scale development projects are politically shaped, and how they transform the politics and culture of the human ecology.

This concept fits within the "political artifacts" discussion largely launched by Langdon Winner's "Do Artifacts Have Politics?" (1986).

Case Studies
In "Dikes and Dams, Thick With Politics," Bijker considers anicuts, dams and tanks in southeastern Indian irrigation systems, levees in the United States and dikes in the Netherlands.

Anicuts in Tamil Nadu, India
The anicuts 1] in Tamil Nadu were developed during a period of over 2000 years to manage silt in large irrigation canals. Not until British engineers interfered in their slow evolution in the early 19th century did they undergo significant rapid engineering changes, and these adaptations caused more problems than aid in efficiency or improved functioning.

The anicuts demonstrate that these long-standing systems transcend “traditional”-“modern” dichotomies. In fact, they “demonstrates a continuum and even a complementarity between these types of knowledge” (Bijker 2007: 114).

Tanks in Karnataka, India
In a study of irrigation tanks by Shah that Bijker profiles, Shah found “the site selected for tank construction was primarily a function of political will to invest in that locality and the topographical features of the site played a secondary role” (in Bijker 2007: 117). Further, this study demonstrates that “traditional” technologies may have embedded politics that reproduce class or caste systems.

The tank systems had long been a staging ground for class antagonisms, where first upper caste fields got priority in irrigation. Then, lower caste farmers used the technical argument that seepage was wasting water resources. Subsequently systems were redesigned to be more efficient which had the additional benefit of distributing water more equitably. The political response was to abandon such “tail-end” systems entirely, placing the caste interests above technical superiority.

"Shah pointedly observes that 'advocates of indigenous or traditional knowledge rarely mention the grave inequity of traditional India while romanticizing the nature and culture of pre-modern science and technology.' When tanks, hailed as traditional technology, are approached from such a romantic perspective, their power in reproducing the social order may go unnoticed" (Bjiker 2007: 117). Nonetheless, Bijker concludes that with better understanding from STS, more so-called "traditional" systems can be modified to cease reproducing these hierarchies, and also "do seem feasible and democratic alternatives to the 'temples of modernity' that are so thick with suppressive power."

Coastal Engineering: Comparisons between the United States and Netherlands
As Bijker showed above, holding the ‘traditional’-‘modern’ dualism may "blind us to the values and social orders that things help to maintain" and would "be counterproductive when adapting these technologies to address current water management problems" (Bijker 2007: 118). But, Bijker provides another comparative case study to caution against "an erroneous conclusion: that we have a value-neutral hydraulic science and engineering, on the one hand, and the sociological-historical research that deals with power relations, on the other."

In this study, Bijker situates the findings among "three decades" of STS scholarship that has likewise demonstrated that "science and engineering are not value free; and power relations typically are technologically and scientifically reproduced." These two cases contrast to "demonstrate how vastly different values may be embedded in seemingly similar things." (Bijker 2007: 118).

Bijker compares civil engineering articles from the U.S. and the Netherlands to contrast the "different sets of values incorporated by American levees and Dutch dikes" (2007: 119). The nonengineering American articles highlight "beach users" and tourists, while those in the Dutch articles focus on broad-based participatory design and management to universally increase quality of life. The early history of Dutch dikes focuses on popular organic shaping of beaches and dunes with sand suppletion. In focusing on natural disasters and their management, "American practice focuses on predicting disasters and mediating the effects once they have happened—in brief, on 'flood hazard mitigation.' Dutch practice is primarily aimed at keeping the water out" (Bijker 2007: 120). These important distinctions articulate a difference in "national styles." But "styles" seems an inappropriate understatement, when "priorities" seems more fitting:

'The key phrase in the United States is “flood hazard mitigation” and the key ideas in this discourse are “prediction” and “insurance”—all of which suggests that the fact of flooding is accepted. The risk criterion that is used in designing levees and other coastal defense structures in the United States is 1:100—that is, they are expected to withstand a “hundred year flood.” This criterion is a technical norm, carrying important professional weight among coastal engineers, but it does not have any legal authority. Very different is the practice in the Netherlands, where the guiding idea is that the water should be kept out at all costs. In the Deltaplan law the risk criterion of 1:10,000 was specified—not merely as a technical norm, but as an obligation embedded in a law unanimously approved by parliament.' (Bijker 2007: 121)

Oosterschelde Storm Surge Barrier
In February of 1953. a storm surge disaster, known as “De Ramp" (Dutch for “the disaster”) broke through the dikes. During on week, 1,835 drowned, and over 750,000 citizens were displaced as 400,000 acres of land were flooded. "The effects were traumatic—at the individual level, for the Netherlands as a country, and for the coastal engineering profession" (Bijker 2007: 120). Over the following decades, the Deltaplan closed all but one outlet: Oosterschelde. The call to close Oosterschelde resulted in a protracted controversy, until a more elegant solution was achieved through a megatechnical project.

media type="youtube" key="0goYcQs7NdY" height="315" width="420" (Profile of Oosterschelde barrier project)

'The Oosterschelde storm surge barrier is not only promoted as a technological wonder; it was also hailed as a marvelously democratic thing. Mockingly—because of its literal compromise character as a thing that can be both open and closed—it can be said to represent the Dutch consensus style of politics. Moreover, the fact that even its technical details were discussed in parliament makes it almost a “democratically designed” thing. Most important, its operating characteristics are not permanently cast in steel and concrete but can be modified and thus adapted to changing ideas about safety and ecology.' (Bijker 2007: 121)

Thick Things and Technological Frames
Bijker suggests that once things have "grown hard and obdurate," they are resistant to change, and "may even stand in the way of innovation." This is the development of the "technological frame": stability in "ways of thinking" and "fixed patterns of interaction" to "emerge around them." "People with a high degree of inclusion in a technological frame will find it difficult to imagine other ways of dealing with the world, of using these things radically differently or even not using them at all" (Bijker 2007: 122)

Locating "Thick Objects" in the Technologies of Development
"The word //development// implies //change//. When considering change as a phenomenon, we might begin by asking: //from what// and //to what// is the change being made? We might also endeavor to ascertain //how// will this change occur. When development is considered as a matter of policy, development takes on a //transitive// property, and thus implies that the change is //directed//. Direction might be questioned in terms of //who or what// is //doing// the directing and //whom or what// is being //directed//" (Brucato 2011; emphasis in original).

In considering technological infrastructure, we might also ask //who// is directing //what//, //what// is directing //whom//, //what// is directing //what//, and //who// is directing //whom//; we look to the myriad connections between and among people, organizations, artifacts and techniques, and we see multidirectional influences and restrictions.

For these reasons, new development projects can be ideal cases to demonstrate the values and motivations that get embedded in infrastructure. They delineate the //before// from the //after//, and thus provide an experimental design in the real world that help us be better able to view the intervention as a causal variable. However, though there is a clear intervention, the //before// is never a //tabula rasa// ("the traditional"), and agencies are exerted besides the agents of development.

media type="youtube" key="HvbOTrczxAA" height="315" width="560"

Another benefit to researching technology in development is that policy and analysis, resistance movements and other discursive and political actions are often less "buried." As the U.S. levee system in Bijker's study demonstrates, the policy trail left an accessible recent history of clearly identifiable values and decisions that had discernible outcomes. Likewise, Helena Norberg-Hodge demonstrated the impacts of two decades of development projects in Leh on the community in Ladakh, India [[|2]]. On the other hand, Bijker's study of anicuts and tanks demonstrated those technical systems had thousands of years of development with only occasional distinct intervention (like British hydrolic projects in the 19th century).

References:
Bijker, W. "Dikes and dams, thick with politics." //ISIS, 98//, 2007. pp. 109-123. Brucato, B. "The paradox of sustainable development: the role of technology in UN discourse.” Pacific Sociological Association, 82nd Annual Meeting, Seattle, WA, March 2011.

**Further reading:**
Bijker, W. //Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs: Toward a Theory of Sociotechnical Change//. MIT Press, 1997. Bijker, W. and J. Law (eds.). //Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change//. MIT Press, 1994. Goldsmith, E. and N. Hildyard. //The Social and Environmental Effects of Large Dams.// Available online here Escobar, A. //Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World//. Princeton University Press, 1994. Norberg-Hodge, H. //Ancient Futures: Learning from the Ladakh//. Sierra Club Books, 1992. Rahnema, M. and V. Bawtree (eds.). //The Post-Development Reader//. Zed Books, 1997. Winner, L. "Do artifacts have politics?" in //The Whale and the Reactor//. MIT Press, 1986.