Social+Constructionism+(Boisvert)


 * Overview:**

Social constructionism, and by extension social constructivism, are sociological theories of knowledge that consider how social phenomenon and/or objects of consciousness develop in social contexts. A social construction or social construct is a concept (or practice) that is the resulting artifact of a particular “thought collective.” When something is socially constructed, it is dependent upon contingent variables within our social selves rather than any inherent quality that it possesses in itself. In this regard, it is diametrically opposed to essentialist claims of transhistoric essences, and instead favors situated knowledge grounded in thick description, in context. Thus, social constructionism and constructivism are based on quasi-empirical examinations of reality, knowledge and learning.

Social construction is, therefore, a by product of countless human choices, and thus relies on the interrogation of how social phenomenon are created, institutionalized, known, and sedimented into tradition by humans. The social construction of reality--realitty--is an ongoing, dynamic and iterative process reproduced by people “acting on” their interpretations and partial knowledge of reality. Because such constructions/constructs are not given, and are historically situated, they must be constantly maintained and re-affirmed (by those who have an interest in its continued existence) in order to persist. Like identity management, such malleability implies their ability to instigate change.

The performance of social constructionism and constructivism uncovers the ways in which people (individuals and groups) contribute to the construction of their own perceived reality, including not only things and facts, but also fundamental, often unconscious belief systems.


 * Denunciation of Objectivity and Abstract Truth:**

In //Muddling Through: Pursing Science and Truths in the 21st Century//, Mike Fortun and Herbert Bernstein describe the elements and processes of social constructionism as consisting of: “how habits of thought, long-standing disciplinary and cultural assumptions, personal history, professional education and training, and even moods and chance all work together to stylize perception and theorizing” (Fortun, 24).

Taking such variables into account, how then is it possible to establish objective truth in the sciences, if knowledge is based on partial truths and consensual reality?

Two camps exist within social constructionist theory to examine this: strong (communication) and weak (knowledge) teleologies. As John R. Searle distinguishes in //The Constructions of Social Reality//:

“Strong social constructivism says "none are able to communicate either a full reality or an accurate ontology, therefore my position must impose, by a sort of divine right, my observer-relative epistemology", whereas weak social constructivism says "none are able to know a full reality, therefore we must cooperate, informing and conveying an objective ontology as best we can" (Searle, 365).

Critiques of this approach to inquiry, however, like Ian Hacking, observe that it’s over-application renders it an empty signifier.

As he avers in his 1999 book //The Social Construction of What?://

"[t]he label 'social constructionism' is more code than description of every Leftist, Marxist, Freudian, and Feminist Post Modernist to call into question every moral, sex, gender, power, and deviant claim as just another essentialist claim.” (Hacking, page?)

In his mapping of texts that mention or actively employ social constructionist frameworks, Hacking reduces the theory (and practice) to the following systematic (or perhaps, metaphoric) shorthand:

1) In the present state of affairs, X is taken for granted, X appears to be inevitable 2) X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. 3) X, or X as it is at present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable. 4) X is quite bad as it is. 5) We would be much better off if X were done away with, or at least radically transformed.

(Hacking, 6-12).

But others, like Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker, see the value of applying social construction to large aspirational, perhaps Reptillian assumptions. In //The Blank State: The Modern Denial of Human Nature//, Pinker suggests that "some categories really are social constructions: they exist only because people tacitly agree to act as if they exist. Examples include money, tenure, citizenship, decorations for bravery, and the presidency of the United States" (Pinker, 202).

In the Watchmen, Rorschach’s matter-of-fact thought bubbles on realitty is the most telling, and startling articulation of social constructivism:

“Existence is random. Has no pattern, save what we imagine after starting at it for too long. No meaning save what we choose to impose. This rudderless world is not shaped by vague metaphysical forces. It is not God who kills the children. Not fate that butchers them or destiny that feeds them to the dogs. It’s us, only us...Free to scrawl own design o this morally blank world” (Moore, Chapter 5, page 26).


 * Applied to Science:**

From Donna Haraway’s radical standpoint in her 1988 article, “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective,” in which she interrogates the role objectivity plays within feminist discourse, she sardonically and quizzically dons the “tempting views” of social constructionist thought forwarded by STS as a way to set up her own argument, which is an equally dialogic wormhole of “warp[ed] speeds in the play of signifiers in a cosmic (perhaps comic) force field.” (Haraway, 577).

Of social constructionists, she maintains that they are bent on the belief that

“the ideological doctrine of scientific method and all the philosophical verbiage about epistemology were cooked up to distract our attention from getting to know the world effectively by practicing the sciences. From this point of view, science--the real game in town--is rhetoric, a series of efforts to persuade relevant social actors that one’s manufactured knowledge is a route to a desired form of very objective power...All knowledge is a condensed node in an agonistic power field” (Haraway, 577). But the provocateur in Haraway, as a practicing scientist, questions the simplicity of an approach that reduces science to “a contestable text and a power field; the content, the form. Period” (Haraway, 577) or worse a metaphor for socially negotiated realitty.

In response to these “dissembling times,” she proffers a feminist version of objectivity, situated knowledges, which attempts to get beyond the “epistemological shock therapy” of the social constructionist agenda.


 * Applied to Technology:**

Langdon Winners book //The Whale and the Reactor: A search for limits in an age of high technology//, is likely the seminal text on SCOT. In his Chapter “Do Artifacts Have Politcs?” he outlines employs case studies (albeit slightly inaccurate material source) to underscore that technology, in addition to its pratical function and environmental side effects, also “embod[ies] specific forms of power and authority” (Winner, 1) shaped by social and economic interests.

As he states, “This perspective offers a novel framework of interpretation and explanation for some of the more puzzling patterns that have taken shape in and around the growth of modern material culture. It’s starting point is a decision to take technical artifacts seriously. Rather than insist that we immediately reduce everything to the interplay of social forces, the theory of technological politics suggests we pay attention to the characteristics of technical objects and the meaning of those characteristics...this approach identifies certain technologies as political phenomenon in their own right.”

By this, he means that such large-scale socio-technical structures, such as bridges (his sole example in this chapter), “embody a systematic of social inequality, a way of engineering relationships among people,” (Winner, 3) that are often invisible, and go beyond their intended use. The invisibility conceals the “ongoing social process in which scientific knowledge, technological invention, and corporate profit reinforce each other in deeply entrenched patterns, patterns that bear the unmistakable stamp of political and economic power.” (Winner, 5).

In "Dikes and Dams, Thick with Politics," Wiebe E. Bijker extends Winner’s argument to examine not only the large-scale socio-technological infrastructure of water management, but also the relationship between its component parts, as socially constructed artefacts thick with values that distinctively shape the societies in which they are situated. By locating his research in and across India, the United States, and the Netherlands, Bijker’s comparative analysis of the history and development of societies also exposes the importance of locally constructed, context-specific analyses, rather than wholesale abstract theoretical application.

Related Terms:

Thought-style Thought-collective Consensual Reality Cognitive Liberty

Examples:

Super Pedestrian: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GVVWmZAStn8

References:

Fortun, Mike and Herbert Bernstein. Muddling Through: Pursuing Science and Truths in the 21st Century. Hacking, Ian. The Social Construction of What? Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999. Harraway, Donna. “Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective.” From Feminist Studies, Vol. 14, No. 3 (Autumn, 1988), pp. 575-599. Moore, Alan and Dave Gibbons. The Watchman. DC Comics, 1995. Pinker, Steven. The Blank State: The Modern Denial of Human Nature. New York: Penguin Books, 2003. Searle, John, R. The Constructions of Social Reality. New York: Free Press, 1997. Winner, L. (1986). The whale and the reactor: a search for limits in an age of high technology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19-39.